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Abstract
The paper considers a new company in the IT industry, founded by a manage-
ment team and partially financed by venture capital. Among the questions that
the paper addresses are: how much venture capital should be acquired to help
finance the development of the firm? How should a wish to grow, with the aim
of making a breakthrough in the IT area, be balanced against the stockholders’
wish to consume? The problem is studied as an optimal control problem with a
random time horizon and we derive a series of prescriptions for investment and
financial decisions.
JEL classification: D92;G24;O32
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optimal control.
1. Introduction
The information technology (IT) industry has been characterized by a
rapid growth of the number of new firms entering the industry. New prod-
uct and service innovations are being developed and marketed in increasing
numbers. Growth has been fast in software development, e-business, inter-
net services, and web design, but also the telecommunications industry
has seen a rapid increase in new equipment and services. Many new firms
have experienced a fast growth in terms of the number of employees, but
the growth has necessarily not been financially sound. Some companies
have used substantial parts of their equity, and the venture capital they
attracted, to cover losses incurred by attempts to grow rapidly, and others
headed for bankruptcy due to severe operating losses. Quite a few busi-
nesses were liquidated without having generated a single dollar of revenue.
This paper sets up a model of investment and financial decision making
in a new firm, and derives a series of prescriptions for its growth and fi-
nancing. Suppose that the company is founded at time t = 0, by acquiring
another firm in the industry. The firm thus acquires a stock of intangible
assets: specialized employee skills, knowledge, expertise, experience, and
information. It has been argued that ”we are entering the knowledge soci-
ety in which the basic economic resource is no longer capital ... but is and
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will be knowledge” (Drucker (1995)). Zingales (2000) posited that during
the last decade, knowledge has replaced capital stocks as the main asset of
a firm. Supposing knowledge can be capitalized, we summarize the firm’s
intangible assets in a stock of intellectual capital (IC) (see also McAdam
and McCreedy (1999)).
We consider a particular objective of the firm, being the development
of a specific innovation (an IT product or service) which will make a break-
through in its specific area. The date of the innovation, T , is unknown at
time zero where the firm must make a plan for its investments in IC. In the
time period until T, making investments in its stock of IC will increase the
probability that the innovation is made by time T . At the initial instant of
time, the firm, represented by a founding management team, can attract
venture capital. The purpose of this is to increase the stock of IC that is
acquired at the initial instant of time. The venture capitalist becomes a
stockholder of the firm.
The paper deals with two main problems, essentially seen from the point
of view of the founding management team. The first problem concerns how
much, if any, venture capital that should be attracted initially. The second
problem is how to design a strategy for the firm’s later investments in IC,
in order to raise the probability of making the discovery.
In both areas, there is an extensive literature which we do not intend
to survey here. The venture capital literature often is concerned with the
contracting problem only, that is, how to regulate the relationship between
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the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist. The problem can be seen as
an agency problem; see, for instance, Sahlman (1988, 1990), Admati and
Pfleiderer (1994), Kaplan and Strömberg (2993). Bergemann and Hege
(1997) considers a problem with a closer relationship to our paper. Their
paper deals with venture capital financing as well as investment decisions
over time.
In the investment area, Schwartz and Zozaya-Gorostiza (2003) study a
setup in which an organization undertakes an IT investment project, which
has a random completion date. The project involves an option of spending
initially an amount of money to acquire an IT asset. After the acquisition,
the organization starts to receive a (random) cash flow and can invest in the
development of the asset. The methodology used to evaluate the project is
real options, using stochastic differential equations and Hamilton-Jacobi-
Bellman equations. The financial aspects are, however, ignored.
Finally there is a stream of literature in the area of R&D that studies
stochastic, dynamic investment problems. Examples are Reinganum (1981,
1982), Kamien and Schwartz (1982), Fudenberg et al. (1983), Grossman
and Shapiro (1986), Doraszelski (2003). The idea here is to model the
hazard rate of successful innovation as a function of the firm’s current
and/or cumulative investments.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 models the firm’s situation
as an optimal control problem with a random time horizon. Section 3
states our main results concerning optimal investment policies. All proofs
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of the results in Section 3 are given in the appendix. Section 4 addresses
the financial problem of how much venture capital to attract. Section 5
contains our concluding remarks.
2. Optimal Control Model
Time t is continuous and at time t = 0 the firm starts its operations.
To increase readability, we present the stochastic optimal control model in
a series of subsections.
2.1. Accounting
At time zero, a founding management team contributes a fixed amount
of capital X0 ≥ 0 and the firm attracts venture capital in amount of L0 ≥ 0.
It may happen that the firm is entirely financed by venture capital (cf.
Bergemann and Hege (1997)), in which case we have X0 = 0, L0 > 0.
The venture capital is used as an initial, one-shot, investment in the
stock of IC. The initial amount of available funds, X0 + L0, are spent to
acquire a stock of intellectual capital, z0 > 0. Let z(t) be a state variable
that represents the dollar value of the firm’s stock of IC by time t ≥ 0. To
simplify, suppose that the stock z(t) is the firm’s only asset. The firm is
likely to have relatively few tangible assets (machinery, equipment, materi-
als), compared to the intangible ones, and we have chosen to disregard the
tangible assets (cf. Brander and Lewis (1986)). Moreover, the cash balance
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is zero at any instant of time.
2.2. Financing
We suppose that after having obtained the venture capital L0, the firm
can attract no more capital. Thus, the firm must be self-financed for t > 0.
This approach to financing differs sharply from one in which a firm can
attract external funds (equity and/or debt) at any instant of time (e.g.,
Schworm (1980), Bensoussan and Lesourne (1981)). On the other hand,
Kamien and Schwartz (1982) argued that R&D investments, which are in
many respects comparable to investments in IC, should be entirely self-
financed.
It is also important to note that the assumed, one-shot venture capital
financing differs from the common practice in which ventures are financed
stagewise (see, e.g., Sahlman (1990), Kaplan and Strömberg (2003)). Thus,
what we have in mind is a situation in which the venture capitalist provides
only startup financing or one in which the capitalist provides all of the
funding commitment on signing the contract. (The latter arrangement
was used only in a minority (15%) of the cases examined in Kaplan and
Strömberg (2003)).
Thus, having obtained the venture capital, the firm must finance any
further investments in IC by retentions. The assumption here is that the
firm allocates a constant part of its IC, say, z̄ > 0, to operations that are
not directly connected to the efforts of making the breakthrough. These
Venture Capital Financed Investments in Intellectual Capital 7
operations generate revenue at the constant rate π > 0. Any excess intel-
lectual capital, z(t) − z̄, is devoted to trying to make the breakthrough,
but this capital generates no operating revenue in the time interval [0, T ],
where T is the date at which the breakthrough is made. This instant of
time is a priori unknown. To save on notation, we define Z(t) = z(t) − z̄,
and impose the constraint Z(t) ≥ 0.
The agreement between the firm and the venture capitalist is a contract
according to which the venture capitalist gets security for her investment in
the firm in the form of stocks (typically, convertible preferred stock). The
venture capitalist thus gets stock in amount of L0.
The stock holders (the venture capitalist and the founders) may receive
returns on their investments, if so decided by the board. The payment of
dividends, however, decreases the funds available for investments in IC.
With regard to the venture capitalist’s exit, we suppose that the agree-
ment states the capitalist exits when the breakthrough is made, that is, at
time T, but she will exit at a predetermined instant of time, τ = const.
> 0, if the breakthrough has not yet been made by time τ . Hence, since
the innovation date is unknown, the exit time of the capitalist is random
and given by te = min{T, τ}. This arrangement gives the capitalist the op-
portunity to leave the firm if the breakthrough has not been made within
reasonable time. The exit of the capitalist at time τ is a typical provision in
a venture capital contract, and is quite similar to the required repayment
of the principal at the maturity of a debt claim (Kaplan and Strömberg
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(2003)). Section 2.4 discusses in detail how the venture capitalist is paid
off when exiting the firm.
2.3. Accumulation of Intellectual Capital
Investments in IC are purposeful efforts of the firm (hiring new staff,
training existing staff), made in order to increase the stock Z(t). The single
purpose of investing is to increase the chances of making the breakthrough.
Let a(t) ≥ 0 denote the investment rate at time t. This is a control variable
of the firm and is also the firm’s only operating cost. The accumulation
dynamics over the time interval [0,∞) are given by
Ż(t) = a(t); Z0 > 0. (1)
The absence of a depreciation term in (1), and nonnegativity of a(t) ≥ 0,
imply that the stock Z cannot decrease. Thus, our assumption is that the
firm cannot decrease Z by laying off employees (a < 0); neither does the
stock Z decrease for the reason that knowledge becomes obsolete. To model
organizational forgetting one can subtract a term δZ(t), δ = const. > 0,
on the right-hand side of (1). Then the firm’s recent experiences would be
more important for making the innovation than the distant experiences.
It can be argued that there should be a concave relationship in (1)
between the investment rate and the rate of change of the stock, to reflect
decreasing marginal effects of investment. We shall capture such a feature
in another way (cf. (3)).
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Consider the time at which a breakthrough occurs. This instant is
represented by a random variable T, which is defined on a probability space
(Ω,F , Pa(·)) and takes its values in [0,∞). The probability measure P
depends on the control (although indirectly) in the following way:
Pa(·)(T ∈ [t, t+ dt) | T ≥ t) = γZ(t)dt+ o(dt), (2)
where o(dt)Ádt→ 0 uniformly in (Z, a) for dt→ 0. The term γZ(t) on the
right-hand side of (2) is the stopping rate and γ > 0 is a constant. The
stopping rate is increasing in Z, and (2) implies








Equation (3) shows that the more intellectual capital that was accumu-
lated during the time interval [0, t), the higher the probability of making
the breakthrough by time t. Thus, the firm’s current chances of making the
innovation depend on its stock of knowledge; knowledge has value. This
hypothesis was employed by, e.g., Fudenberg et al. (1983) and Doraszel-
ski (2003) and seems more plausible than the one used in other models
of innovation (e.g., Reinganum (1981, 1982), Bergemann and Hege (1997),
Dockner et al. (2000)). In these works, the probability of making a break-
through depends on current investment only and hence is independent of
accumulated knowledge. Then knowledge is irrelevant for the firm’s current
efforts.
Recall from (1) that current investments translate linearly into IC. How-
ever, due to (3), there is a diminishing marginal efficiency of IC in increasing
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the stopping rate (since the probability in (3) grows in a concave fashion).
The specification in (2) also implies Pr(T =∞) = exp £−γ R∞0 Z(s)ds¤ .
Hence, a necessary and sufficient condition for having a finite completion
time T is that
R t
0 Z(s)ds→ +∞ for t→ +∞. This is true, as Z0 is positive
and Z(·) is nondecreasing.
2.4. Objective Function
To construct the firm’s objective function, we need to discuss the fol-
lowing issues. What happens when the breakthrough is made, and what
will the venture capitalist receive, in return on her investment, upon her
exit from the firm?
As to the first question, we summarize the firm’s situation in a simple,
but standard, way. Let P̄ = const. > 0 denote the expected value of an
uncertain reward to be earned at time T. (One can think of P̄ as being the
value of a patent). The reward being constant means, in particular, that
it does not depend on Z(T ), the stock of IC at the innovation date. Hence
the reward is the same whether the innovation is made by a small or a large
firm (cf. Grossman and Shapiro (1986)). As concerns the exit time te of
the venture capitalist, we distinguish two cases:
Case 1 : te = T ⇐⇒ T < τ .
The reward P̄ earned at time T is divided among the founders and the
venture capitalist such that the latter gets θ(L0)P̄ and the former gets the
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rest, (1−θ(L0))P̄ , where θ(L0) ∈ [0, 1). The share θ(L0) depends only on the
amount of venture capital provided; thus the share is time-invariable and
does not depend on the innovation time T. We assume θ(0) = 0, θ0(L0) >
0, θ00(L0) 6= 0.
Case 2 : te = τ ⇐⇒ T > τ .
The breakthrough has not yet been made by time τ , which is the pre-
determined, latest exit time of the venture capitalist. Hence she exits at
t = τ and receives, according to the redemption provision of the contract,
an amount of βL0, β = const. > 0. If β = 1, the capitalist receives the prin-
cipal amount of stock in the company. In the majority of venture capital
contracts, however, β is greater than one. If the contract provides for ac-
cruing dividends, our assumption is that the cumulated amount is included
in βL0 (which can be accomplished by a suitable choice of β).
Denoting the firm’s positive and constant rate of time preference by i,
the objective functional, J, of the firm can now be constructed:











e−it[π − a(t)]dt+ e−iT P̄ − e−iτβL0
¸
. (4)
The objective is the maximization of the expected present value (at time
zero) of the profit stream π − a(t) and the reward P̄ , minus the expected
payment, θ(L0)P̄ or βL0, upon the exit of the venture capitalist.
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A pair (Z, a) is feasible if the objective value J is finite, state equation
(1) is satisfied, and the control constraint a(t) ∈ [0,π] is fulfilled for t ∈
[0,∞).
3. Main Results
This section characterizes an optimal solution of the stochastic optimal
control problem in Section 2, but without stating any proofs. These can be
found in the appendix.
Using Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman equations is a standard way to solve
a stochastic optimal control problem. It turns out, however, that in the
setup at hand this technique is less useful. The reason is that the problem
is nonautonomous, leading to a partial differential equation for the value
function. Instead, we apply a maximum principle for an infinite horizon,
deterministic optimal control problem. This problem is equivalent to the
stochastic optimal control problem with random stopping time that was
stated in Section 2 (cf. Boukas et al. (1990), Carlson et al. (1991), Sorger
(1991)).
The deterministic problem has two state variables, Z(t) and Y (t), where
the latter will be defined below. It turns out to be expedient to solve the
problem backwards, and to divide it in two subproblems.
Given any feasible pair (Zτ , Yτ ) = (Z(τ), Y (τ)) that results from using
an optimal investment policy on the interval [0, τ), we first solve a subprob-
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lem on the time interval [τ ,∞). Denote this subproblem by P2 and define
the state variable




in which Yτ is a fixed but, so far, arbitrary real number. The objective
functional of problem P2, denoted by J2, represents the expected present
value at time t = τ and is given by
J2(a(·);Zτ , Yτ ) = Ea(·)
·Z T
τ
e−i(t−τ)[π − a(t)]dt+ e−i(T−τ)P̄ − βL0
¸
=
− βL0 + eiτ+Yτ
Z ∞
τ
e−[it+Y (t)][π − a(t) + P̄γZ(t)]dt, (5)
and the state dynamics are
Ż(t) = a(t), Z(τ) = Zτ . (6)
Ẏ (t) = γZ(t), Y (τ) = Yτ .
When a solution of P2 has been obtained, one can determine the optimal
value of J2, which will be denoted by J∗2 (Zτ , Yτ ).
Then we solve the full problem on the time interval [0,∞). This problem
has the following objective functional, when cast as a deterministic optimal
control problem:




e−[it+Y (t)][π − a(t) + (1− θ(L0))P̄γZ(t)]dt+
e−iτJ∗2 (Zτ , Yτ ). (7)
For t ∈ [0, τ), the dynamics of the problem are given by the state equations
Ż(t) = a(t), Z(0) = Z0 (8)
Ẏ (t) = γZ(t), Y (0) = 0.
The calculations will proceed as follows. Section 3.1 provides a solution of
P2 and Section 3.2 solves the full problem.
3.1. Solution of P2
Define costate variables λ1(t),λ2(t) associated with state variables Z
and Y , respectively. In (5), the term eiτ+Yτ is constant and can be dis-
regarded in the characterization of an optimal solution. The Hamiltonian
is
H = e−(it+Y )[π − a+ P̄γZ] + λ1a+ λ2γZ,
which is linear in the control a, and hence an optimal investment policy is
bang-bang or singular. There are three candidate policies. In terms of the
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costate λ1(t) they can be stated as
Dividend : a(t) = 0 =⇒ λ1(t)eit+Y (t) < 1
Investment : a(t) = π =⇒ λ1(t)eit+Y (t) > 1
Singular : a(t) ∈ [0,π] =⇒ λ1(t)eit+Y (t) = 1. (9)
The time function λ1(t)eit+Y (t) has an interpretation as a shadow price of
the stock Z, which provides an intuition for the policies in (9). Notice that
since stockholders are risk neutral, the value of a marginal dollar of net
profit equals one. A dividend policy pays maximally to the stockholders
and since there are no investments, the stock of IC remains constant. This
happens if a unit of IC has a shadow price less than one and then the
marginal dollar should be paid to the owners. Since the stock Z cannot be
decreased (to get additional funds to pay as dividends), it is kept constant.
Using an investment policy, the stock of intellectual capital grows at its
maximal rate; there is no payout to stockholders. The reason is that the
shadow price exceeds the value to the stockholders of having the marginal
dollar paid out as dividends. Then the dollar is spent entirely on invest-
ments. Finally, if the shadow price equals one, stockholders are indifferent
between investing the marginal dollar and having it paid out.
A particular interest relates to the stock level Z associated with a sin-
gular policy. Suppose that one chooses the singular control as a = 0. Then
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Note that (11) implies P̄ > πi . This inequality means that the expected
reward exceeds the present value of a perpetuity of π. Otherwise the firm
would have no incentive to try to make the innovation.
The instant of time at which the stock Z(t) reaches the singular level






Proposition 1 characterizes an optimal solution of P2. The reader should
be aware that the optimality conditions applied in the proposition are nec-
essary only and require the existence of an optimal control.. Due to the
fact that the discount factor involves the state variable Y, it is not possible
to verify standard sufficiency conditions based upon concavity of Hamilto-
nians.
Proposition 1 For any Zτ ≥ Z0, an optimal solution of P2 is:
(i): If Zτ ≥ ZS then a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [τ ,∞).
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(ii): If Zτ < ZS, then
a(t) =
 π0
 for t ∈
 [τ , tS)[tS,∞)
 .
The intuition for the zero-investment policy in Case (i) is that the stock
level Zτ is ”high” (Zτ ≥ ZS). Then no further investments are needed. (If
Zτ > ZS, the dividend policy is used. If Zτ = ZS , the singular policy is
used). Case (ii) occurs if the stock level Zτ is ”low” (Zτ < ZS). Investment
then is worthwhile, and is continued until the stock Z(t) reaches the singular
level ZS .
The policy stated in Proposition 1 (ii) works as follows. Investing at the
rate a = π makes the state Z increase at the maximal rate. The purpose is
to get as quickly as possible from the initial level Zτ to the singular level
ZS . Once the latter is reached, it is optimal to stay there forever. In Case
(i) one would also like to approach the singular level as fast as possible.
In our setup, where disinvestment is impossible and there is no exogeneous
decay of the capital stock, ZS clearly cannot be reached if Zτ > ZS . The
best option then is to stay forever at the level Zτ . Clearly, if Zτ = ZS the
firm is already at the singular stock level. This is, however, a hairline case.
For a further interpretation of the results of the proposition, consider
Case (i). Since there is no investment, the stock Z(t) is constant, equal to,
say Z̃. The elementary probability of the time interval [t, t + dt) for the
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stopping time T then is
γZ̃e−
R t
τ γZ̃ds = γZ̃e−γZ̃(t−τ).
The expected present value of employing a zero-investment policy, as of








Now suppose, hypothetically, that a marginal investment were made. This
would increase marginally the stock of IC. Differentiation in (13) with re-






Equating this expected marginal revenue to the marginal cost of investment,
which is one, yields
γ(iP̄ − π)− (i+ γZ)2 = 0. (14)
Using (10), (14), and Proposition 1 we conclude the following. For
Z̃ > ZS, an investment would make marginal cost exceed expected marginal
revenue. This is why no investment should take place. If Z = ZS, expected
marginal revenue equals marginal cost. This is a singular arc, along which
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a = 0. Finally, if Z < ZS, expected marginal revenue of investment exceeds
marginal cost, at least during some initial interval of time, say, [τ , τ +∆].
In that case, a dividend policy is suboptimal and investment is worthwhile.
Thus, a(t) = π on the time interval (τ , tS ]. Investment is stopped at time
tS, because at this instant, the stock reaches the singular level ZS .
3.2. Complete Solution of the Investment Problem
The objective functional of this problem, when cast as a deterministic




e−[it+Y (t)][π − a(t) + (1− θ(L0))P̄γZ(t)]dt+
e−iτJ∗2 (Zτ , Yτ ). (15)
For t ∈ [0, τ), the objective to maximized is the integral on the right-hand
side of (15). The dynamics are
Ż(t) = a(t), Z(0) = Z0 (16)
Ẏ (t) = γZ(t), Y (0) = 0.
Denote this subproblem by P1 and note (also here) that one cannot verify
sufficiency conditions since the concavity requirements are not fulfilled.
The characterization of an optimal investment policy in problem P1 is
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similar to that in P2 and it suffices to note the following. Defining a costate
µ1(t) associated with state variable Z(t), one can identify three candidate
policies:
Investment : a(t) = π =⇒ µ1(t)eit+Y (t) > 1
Dividend : a(t) = 0 =⇒ µ1(t)eit+Y (t) < 1
Singular : a(t) ∈ [0,π] =⇒ µ1(t)eit+Y (t) = 1.
An optimal solution of P1 is characterized in Proposition 2, in which







γ(i(1− θ(L0))P̄ − π)
¶
. (17)
To have a positive singular level ZSA, we strengthen the assumption in (11)










that is, the singular stock level in problem P1 than in P2. The reason
clearly is that in problem P1, the reward P̄ must be shared with the venture
capitalist.
If Z0 < ZSA the instant of time at which Z(t) reaches ZSA, when
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Proposition 2 Assume that ZSA − πτ > 0. For any Z0 > 0, an optimal
solution is:
(i): If Z0 ≥ ZSA, then
a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, τ).
(ii): If ZSA − πτ ≤ Z0 < ZSA, then
a(t) =
 π0
 for t ∈
 [0, tSA)[tSA, τ)
 .
(iii): If Z0 < ZSA − τπ, then
a(t) = π for t ∈ [0, τ).
The intuition of Case (i) is that it occurs if the initial stock Z0 is already
sufficiently high; in particular, it exceeds the singular level ZSA. Then it
does not pay to invest in order to increase the stock of IC.
In Cases (ii) and (iii), the initial stock Z0 is insufficient and investments
are used to increase it (maximally). In Case (iii), investments continue
throughout the time interval [0, τ). In Case (ii), investment is stopped
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at time tSA, i.e., at the instant of time where the singular stock level is
reached.











ZSA − πτ . (19)
In Case (iii) we have tSA > τ ⇐⇒ Z0 < ZSA − πτ . This means that even
when investment is done at the maximal rate π during the entire time
interval [0, τ), it cannot increase the initial stock Z0 to the singular level
ZSA. In Case (ii) we have tSA ≤ τ ⇐⇒ Z0 ≥ ZSA − πτ , which means that
investing throughout the time interval [0, τ) would overshoot the singular
level. Therefore, investment goes on only during the time interval [0, tSA).
Clearly, the initial stock Z0 is larger in Case (ii) than in Case (iii); hence
there is less need for investments.
We are now ready to state a main result of the paper, the characteri-
zation of an optimal solution of the full problem. This result is stated as
Proposition 3.
Proposition 3 For any Z0 > 0, an optimal solution is:
(i): If Z0 ≥ ZS, then
a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0,∞).
Venture Capital Financed Investments in Intellectual Capital 23




























(iv): If Z0 ≤ ZSA − πτ , then
a(t) =
 π0
 for t ∈
 [0, tS)[tS ,∞)
 .
Proposition 3 is derived from Propositions 1 and 2. The four cases in
Proposition 3 are ordered in accordance with increasing investment efforts,
or, equivalently, decreasing initial stocks of IC.
In Case (i), the initial stock level Z0 is sufficiently high and there is no
need for investments at all. In Case (ii), the stock level Z0 is less than the
”long term” singular level ZS and it pays to invest to build up intellectual
capital. Investments are, however, postponed until the exit of the venture
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capitalist. The reason is that Z0 exceeds the ”short term” singular stock
level ZSA. In Case (iii) we see a sort of ”pulsing strategy” where investment
switches twice between maximal effort and zero. Although the long term
singular level has not yet been reached at time tSA, investment is temporar-
ily stopped - until the venture capitalist exits. Then investment is resumed
and is continued until the long term singular stock level is reached. In Case
(iii), the initial stock is the lowest in the four cases, and it pays to keep on
investing until reaching the long term singular level ZS .
In Cases (ii), (iii),and (iv) we see the implications of the knowledge
effect, which reflects the fact that the firm’s past efforts contribute to its
chances of making the discovery. Due to that effect, the firm scales down
its investments in IC as the stock of knowledge (IC) increases (Doraszelski
(2003)). In such cases, investment expenditures can be reduced (although
rather abruptly) as the stock of IC increases. (In a nonlinear model, one
would see a smoother decrease in the investment rate).
4. Financial Policy
The derivations of Section 3 proceeded under the assumption that the
amount of venture capital, L0, was fixed. It remains to discuss the choice
of L0. This amount can be seen as a parameter, determined at time zero,
that influences the dynamic optimization problem.
We assumed that venture capital can only be used for an initial, one-
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shot, investment in the stock of IC. For the stockholders, the intertemporal
trade-off is between giving up current consumption in order to invest (to
increase the probability of winning the reward P̄ ), and refraining from
investment in order to consume now. We have seen that this decision
depends on the stock level Z0. Recalling that Z0 = X0 + L0 shows that
the venture capital decision will influence the investment decision. Thus,
increasing the amount of venture capital will increase Z0, the initial stock
of IC, and hence reduce the need for later investments (see, for example,
Proposition 3, Case (i)). On the other hand, increasing the amount of
venture capital will increase βL0, the exit payment to the venture capitalist
as well as the capitalist’s share, θ(L0), of the reward.
The occurrence of the four cases in Proposition 3 depend on the amount
of venture capital, L0, such that Case (i) occurs if L0 ≥ ZS −X0, Case (ii)
if ZSA−X0 ≤ L0 ≤ ZS−X0, Case (iii) if ZSA−πτ −X0 < L0 < ZSA−X0,
and Case (iv) if L0 ≤ ZSA − πτ − X0. Recall that in Case (i) the firm
does not invest at all. The intuition is that the amount of venture capital
attracted, and used in the initial acquisition of IC, is sufficiently large. In
Cases (ii), (iii), and (iv) there is an initial phase of investment, which is
warranted by the fact that in these cases the amount of venture capital is
smaller. Investments go on for the longest interval of time in Case (iv),
which is intuitive since here the amount of venture capital is the smallest
Denote by J(L0) the firm’s payoff over the time interval [0,∞). Using
(7) and (15) yields










e−[it+Y (t)][π − a(t) + P̄γZ(t)]dt− βL0
¸
.
To determine the amount L0, we apply a necessary optimality condition
in Léonard and Long (1992, Th. 7.11.1 ). Whenever L0 is strictly positive












e−[it+Y (t)]P̄γZ(t)dt > 0.
The condition in (21) compares the costate λ1(0) (the shadow price of Z0)
with the present value of the constant β. Recall that if the venture capitalist
exits at the predetermined time τ , she is paid the amount βL0. If the shadow
price exceeds the (present value of the) marginal payment to be made at
time τ , venture capital financing should be attracted in accordance with
(21). On the other hand, if βe−iτ ≥ λ1(0), no capital should be attracted.
The choice in (21) depends on the exit time τ and the rate of time pref-
erence, i. To see the implications of varying these parameters, we proceed
as follows.
Case A. Time preference rate fixed.
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The choice of L0 = 0 is more likely for τ small (since the condition in
(21) then can be satisfied by a larger range of βs). Thus, if the latest exit
time of the venture capitalist is in the near future, the founders do not wish
to attract venture capital. The policy could also occur for a large τ , but
then a large value of β is necessary. The intuition here is that although the
exit of the capitalist is quite far in the future, the founders do not attract
venture capital due to the large amount, βL0, that must be paid upon exit
of the capitalist.
Case B. Exit time fixed.
The choice L0 = 0 is more likely for i small. Thus, if the founders are
far-sighted, they are reluctant to attract venture capital. The policy could
also occur for a large value of i, but then a large value of β is necessary.
The intuition here is that although the founders are myopic, they do not
attract venture capital due to the large amount that must be paid upon
exit of the capitalist.





0. Thus, the share that the venture capitalist receives from the
reward increases progressively with the amount of venture capital supplied.
This could be seen as a means of hedging the capitalist’s investment.
Using (21) yields L0 =
λ1(0)−βe−iτ
K . In this expression, a direct and an
indirect effect can be identified. The direct effect is that the amount of
venture capital decreases if the reward P̄ increases. The reason is that a
Venture Capital Financed Investments in Intellectual Capital 28
marginal increase in L0 leads to a larger monetary loss, θ0(L0)P̄ , when P̄ is
large. The indirect effect concerns the fact that a higher reward increases
the incentive to invest in intellectual capital and thus affects L0 positively.
In the model, this is reflected in the fact that the threshold stock ZSA
increases with the reward (cf. (17)). According to Proposition 3 this will
make sequences (iii) and (iv) more likely as optimal ones. In these two
policies, the shadow price λ1(0) is sufficiently large to influence positively
the amount of venture capital L0 (cf. (21)).
5. Concluding Remarks
The paper has considered a dynamic optimization problem of a firm
that tries to make a breakthrough with a new IT product. The probability
of achieving a breakthrough can be increased by investing in intellectual
capital (IC). The initial investment in IC can be financed by venture capi-
tal. The paper has determined optimal investment policies and an optimal
amount of venture capital. The singular stock of IC is a main determinant
of the type of the investment policy.
We conclude by stating two extensions that should be promising areas
for future research.
• Venture capital is usually provided in stages, and not as a lump sum
at the start of the venture. This is perhaps the most limiting assump-
tion of the paper. Capital being provided stagewise means that the
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firm receives capital as seed money, startup capital, capital for devel-
opment of prototypes, etc. (see Sahlman (1990, Table 2) for details).
A priori, the completion times of the various stages are random, and
the state in which a new stage starts out is random, too. The method-
ology of piecewise deterministic optimal control problems apply here
(see, e.g., Carlson et al. (1991), Dockner et al. (2000)).
• Introduce competitors. There is a considerable literature in applied
differential games dealing with innovations and R&D in competi-
tive environments (see, e.g., Reinganum (1981, 1982), Dockner et
al. (2000)).
6. Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1
In (5), the term eiτ+Yτ is constant and can be disregarded in the char-
acterization of an optimal solution. Let λ1(t),λ2(t) be costate variables
associated with state variables Z and Y, respectively, and η1(t), η2(t) be
Lagrangian multipliers associated with the control constraint a(t) ∈ [0,π].
The Hamiltonian is
H = e−(it+Y )[π − a+ P̄γZ] + λ1a+ λ2γZ,
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and the Lagrangian then becomes
L = H + η1a+ η2(π − a).
Suppose that there exists an optimal solution of problem P2. Necessary
optimality conditions then are
λ1(t) = η2(t)− η1(t) + e−(it+Y (t)) (A.1)
λ̇1(t) = −e−(it+Y (t))γP̄ − γλ2(t) (A.2)
λ̇2(t) = e
−(it+Y (t))[π − a(t) + P̄γZ(t)] (A.3)
η1(t)a(t) = 0, a(t) ≥ 0, η1(t) > 0
η2(t)(π − a(t)) = 0, a(t) ≤ π, η2(t) > 0
lim
t→∞λ2(t) = 0. (A.4)
Due to the linearity of the Hamiltonian in the control, an optimal in-
vestment policy is bang-bang or singular. Clearly, both η1 and η2 cannot
be positive and hence three candidate policies remain. Characterized by
thesigns of the Lagrangian multipliers they are
Investment (a = π) Dividend (a = 0) Singular (a = 0)
η1 0 + 0
η2 + 0 0
.
The singular investment policy is indeterminate in the interval [0,π] and
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we choose a = 0. The stock level ZS associated with this singular policy is
constant and given by (10). The instant of time at which the stock Z(t)





In what follows we characterize in detail the three candidate policies.
Investment policy (Path 1)
η1(t) = 0, η2(t) > 0, Ż(t) = a(t) = π.
From (A.1) and (A.3) it follows that
λ1(t) = e
−(it+Y (t)) + η2(t) (A.5)
λ̇2(t) = e
−(it+Y (t))P̄γZ(t). (A.6)
Differentiating λ1(t) in (A.5) twice with respect to time yields
λ̇1(t) = −e−(it+Y (t))[i+ γZ(t)] + η̇2(t) (A.7)
λ̈1(t) = e
−(it+Y (t))[(i+ γZ(t))2 − γπ] + η̈2(t). (A.8)





−(it+Y (t)){γ(iP̄ + π)− [i+ γZ(t)]2} (A.9)
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Dividend policy (Path 2)
η2(t) = 0, η1(t) > 0, Ż(t) = a(t) = 0, Z(t) = ZD = const. > 0.
From (A.1) and (A.3) it follows that
λ1(t) = e
−(it+Y (t)) − η1(t) (A.10)
λ̇2(t) = e
−(it+Y (t))[π + P̄γZD]. (A.11)
Differentiating λ1(t) in (A.10) twice with respect to time yields
λ̇1(t) = −e−(it+Y (t))[i+ γZD]− η̇1(t) (A.12)
λ̈1(t) = e
−(it+Y (t))[i+ γZD]2 − η̈1(t). (A.13)
Differentiating in (A.2) with respect to time and using (A.11) yields
λ̈1(t) = e
−(it+Y (t))γ(iP̄ − π)
and using (A.13) then provides
e−(it+Y (t))[i+ γZD]2 − η̈1(t) = e−(it+Y (t))γ(iP̄ − π) =⇒ (A.14)
η̈1(t) = e
−(it+Y (t))[(i+ γZD)2 − γ(iP̄ − π)].
Singular policy (Path 3)
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η1(t) = η2(t) = 0, Ż(t) = a(t) = 0, Z(t) = ZS = const. > 0.
The characterizations of costates and Lagrangian multipliers follow from




−(it+Y (t))[π + P̄γZS] (A.16)
λ̇1(t) = −e−(it+Y )(i+ γZS) (A.17)




γ(iP̄ − π)]. (A.18)
We construct a solution that satisfies the necessary optimality condi-
tions, by using a path-coupling procedure which starts by considering Path
2 or Path 3 as a candidate for being a final path. A final path is one that is
employed as of some instant of time till infinity. Path 1 will not be consid-
ered a candidate for being a final path from the following reason: since the
probability of making the innovation is concavely increasing in the stock of
IC, it is clearly suboptimal to keep on investing forever.
We start by considering the case where Path 2 is the final path.
Lemma 4 If Path 2 is the final path, it cannot be preceded by any other
path.
Proof. By contradiction. Since Z is a ”good stock”, we can safely
assume that the costate λ1(t) is always non-negative. Note that (A.10)
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implies
lim
t→∞λ1(t) = 0 (A.19)
lim
t→∞ η1(t) = 0 (A.20)
along Path 2.
Now suppose that Path k (k = 1 or 3) were to precede Path 2. Then,
at the coupling point t̄ between Path k and Path 2, it must be true that
η1(t̄) = 0,
which follows from the required continuity of λ1(t), and using (A.5), (A.15).
By definition, η1(t) is positive on Path 2 for t ∈ (t̄,∞).Then, using η1(t̄) = 0
and (A.20), it follows that η1(t)must have at least one maximum along Path
2. In such a point we have η̈1(t) < 0. From (A.14) and the fact that Z(t) =
const. = ZD along Path 2, one therefore obtains
γ(iP − π)− (i+ γZD)2 > 0
everywhere along Path 2. Hence, by (A.14) it holds that η̈1(t) < 0 every-
where on Path 2. This means that η̇1(t) decreases along Path 2 (or, equiv-
alently, that η1 is a strictly concave function).
On the other hand, using the necessary conditions (A.2), (A.4), and
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(A.12) yields
η̇1(t) = e
−(it+Y (t))[P̄γ − (i+ γZD)] + γλ2(t)
=⇒ lim
t→∞ η̇1(t) = 0. (A.21)
However, (A.21 cannot hold if η̇1 is decreasing everywhere on Path 2. Thus,
supposing that another path can precede Path 2 leads to a violation of the
necessary optimality conditions. This observation completes the proof.
Lemma 5 When Path 2 is used for t ∈ (τ ,∞) it holds that
γ(iP̄ − π)− (i+ γZD)2 < 0.
Proof. Since Z is constant along Path 2, (A.14) shows that η̈1 does not
change its sign. From this fact, and using (A.20) and (A.21) it follows that
η̈1(t) > 0 everywhere along Path 2, which via (A.14) leads to the result.
Next, suppose that Path 3 is the final path, in which case (A.18) is
satisfied everywhere along Path 3. For this situation we have the following
result.
Lemma 6 If Path 3 is the final path, a solution is given by the sequence
Path 1 → Path 3, where on Path 1 it holds that
γ(iP̄ − π)− (i+ γZ(t))2 > 0.
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Proof. From (A.9) and (A.18) one obtains η̈2(t
−
13) > 0, where t13 is the
moment of time at which Path 1 passes into Path 3. Since Z1(t) increases
on Path 1, it follows that
η̈2(t) > 0
everywhere along Path 1.
From (A.5), (A.15), continuity of λ1(t), and the fact that η2(t) > 0
along Path 1, it follows that
η2(t
−
13) = 0 (A.22)
η̇2(t
−
13) 6 0. (A.23)
Now, η̈2(t) > 0 on Path 1, (A.22) and (A.23) imply that η2(t) decreases
everywhere along Path 1.
Suppose that another path were to precede Path 1. This would require
that at the coupling point, t̃, say, between these two paths it must hold that
η2(t̃) = 0 since otherwise continuity λ1(t) would be violated. However, this
is incompatible with (A.22) and the fact that η2(t) is decreasing everywere
along Path 1. This demonstrates that no path can be coupled before the
sequence Path 1 → Path 3. The inequality stated in the lemma follows
directly follows from (A.18) and the fact that Z(t) increases on Path 1.
Lemma 7 Path 2 cannot precede Path 3 if the latter is a final path.
Proof. By contradiction. All along the sequence Path 2 → Path 3,
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(A.18) holds since Z(t) is constant on both paths. This implie, using (A.14),
that η̈1(t) = 0 along Path 2 and hence η̇1(t) is constant.
Now, continuity of λ1(t) requires that just before a coupling point t23
between Paths 2 and 3 it must hold that η1(t
−
23) = 0, cf. (A.10) and (A.15).
Hence η̇1(t
−
23) must be negative, and since η̇1.is constant, it is negative
everywhere along Path 2.
From (A.2) follows that λ̇1(t) is continuous on every path. Using (A.12)
and (A.17) shows that this is violated for a strictly negative η̇1 This com-
pletes the proof.
We summarize the results of the above lemmas as follows. Consider
problem P2. Sequences of paths that satisfy the necessary optimality con-
ditions are the following:
γ(iP̄ − π)− (i+ γZτ )2 < 0⇐⇒ Zτ > ZS : Path 2
γ(iP̄ − π)− (i+ γZτ )2 = 0⇐⇒ Zτ = ZS : Path 3
γ(iP̄ − π)− (i+ γZτ )2 > 0⇐⇒ Zτ < ZS : Path 1 → Path 3.
The two first sequences generate the control path a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [τ ,∞).
The last one generates the control path a(t) = π for t ∈ [τ , tS), a(t) = 0 for
t ∈ [tS ,∞). This completes the proof of Proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 2
Essentially, a proof of this proposition is superflouous; in most respects
it would be similar to that of Proposition 1.
Venture Capital Financed Investments in Intellectual Capital 38
Proposition 1 deals with an infinite horizon problem with a fixed initial
state Zτ . In this problem there is a singular stock level ZS and the optimal
policy is to reach this level as quickly as possible. If Zτ < ZS, the firm
invests maximally to reach the singular stock level at time tS ; due to the
infinite horizon, ZS will always be reached. On the other hand, if the initial
stock Zτ exceeds the singular level ZS, no investment is needed.
The situation in Proposition 2 is basically the same. Proposition 2 deals
with a finite horizon problem with a fixed initial state Z0. In this problem
there is also a singular stock level, ZSA, and the optimal policy is to reach
this level as quickly as possible, by using maximal investment efforts. If
Z0 < ZSA, the firm invests maximally to try to reach the singular stock level
at time tSA. However, due to the finite horizon, ZSA may not be reached
before the end of the horizon, τ . Thus, one needs to distinguish Cases
(ii) and (iii) in Proposition 2. In Case (ii) there is time enough to reach
the singular level, and investment is discontinued during the remaining
time interval [tSA, τ). In Case (iii), investment goes on until the end of the
horizon, because tSA > τ . Finally, as in Proposition 1, if the initial stock
Z0 exceeds the singular level ZSA, no investment is needed.
Proof of Proposition 3
To establish Proposition 3, we introduce the two functions
f(Z) = γ(iP̄ − π)− (i+ γZ(t))2
fA(Z) = γ(i(1− θ)P̄ − π)− (i+ γZ(t))2,
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and recall that ZSA < ZS . It is convenient to use this notation to summarize
the results of Propositions 1 and 2:
Proposition 1 :
(i): If f(Zτ ) ≤ 0, then a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [τ ,∞).
(ii): If f(Zτ ) > 0, then a(t) = π for t ∈ [τ , tS), a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [tS ,∞).
Proposition 2: Let Zπτ , Z0 + πτ .
(i): If fA(Z0) ≤ 0, then a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, τ).
(ii): If fA(Z0) > 0 and Zπτ > ZSA, then a(t) = π for t ∈ [0, tSA),
a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [tSA, τ).
(iii): If fA(Z0) > 0 and Zπτ ≤ ZSA, then a(t) = π for t ∈ [0, τ).
Now we can prove Proposition 3.
Case (i):
The assumption is f(Z0) ≤ 0, which implies fA(Z0) < 0. Hence, by
Proposition 2(i), we have a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, τ), which implies Zτ = Z0.
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Then, by the assumption of Case (i), one obtains f(Zτ ) = f(Z0) ≤ 0. Using
Proposition 1(i) then yields a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [τ ,∞). The proof is complete.
Case (ii):
The assumption is fA(Z0) ≤ 0 and f(Z0) > 0, The first inequality
implies, by Proposition 2(i), that a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [0, τ). Then one has
Zτ = Z0, which implies f(Zτ ) = f(Z0) > 0. Using Proposition 1(ii) then
yields a(t) = π for t ∈ [τ , tS) and a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [tS ,∞). The proof is
complete.
Case (iii):
The assumption is fA(Z0) > 0 and Z0 > ZSA− πτ . The first inequality
implies, by Proposition 2(ii), that a(t) = π for t ∈ [0, tSA) and a(t) = 0 for
t ∈ [tSA, τ). Then Zτ = ZSA in Proposition 1 and hence f(Zτ ) = f(ZSA).
However, f(ZSA) > 0, and using Proposition 1(ii) one obtains a(t) = π for
t ∈ [τ , tS) and a(t) = 0 for t ∈ [tS,∞). The proof is complete.
Case (iv):
The assumption is fA(Z0) > 0. By Proposition 2(iii) we get a(t) = π
for t ∈ [0, τ). This implies Zτ < ZSA < ZS, and hence f(Zτ ) > f(ZS) = 0.
Then, by Proposition 1(ii), we get a(t) = π for t ∈ [τ , tS) and a(t) = 0 for
t ∈ [tS .∞). The proof is complete.
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